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September, 1942

N o . 15

The Renegotiation
of War Contracts

HIS B U L L E T I N deals with financial statements of contractors or subcontractors who are affected by the provisions of the War Profits
Control Act.
SUMMARY STATEMENT
In the financial statements of contractors or subcontractors who are
subject to the provisions of the War Profits Control Act indication
should be given of the possibility of renegotiation thereunder of government contracts or subcontracts. In some cases a reserve, shown as
a deduction in the income account, may be desirable, but probably in
most cases, particularly at the present stage, a footnote to the financial statements will accomplish the purpose of disclosure.
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DISCUSSION
In dealing with the problem of accounting for special reserves
arising out of the war 1 the committee on accounting procedure emphasized the necessity of providing, by charges in the current income
statement, properly classified, for all foreseeable costs and losses applicable against current revenues. In so doing the committee recognized the limited significance of income statements prepared currently
to cover comparatively short periods of time and pointed out that the
tentative character of such statements is accentuated under war conditions. Various kinds of war reserves were considered and accountants
were urged to encourage their establishment, not only in the interests
of the business enterprise, but in the interests of the national economy
as a whole. It was further suggested that the government might well
give consideration to the necessity for such reserves in its fiscal policies
generally, and particularly in respect of taxation.
War Profits Control Act

The tentative character of current financial statements has been
further accentuated as a result of the "renegotiation" or "war profits
1
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control" provisions of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, approved April 28, 1942.2
Under Sec. 403 (b) of that Act the War Department, Navy Department, and Maritime Commission are authorized and directed to
insert in any contract for an amount in excess of $100,000 thereafter
made:
(1) a provision for renegotiation of the contract price at a period
when the profits can be determined with reasonable certainty,
(2) a provision for the retention or recovery by the United
States of any portion of the contract price which is found to
represent excessive profits, and
(3) a provision requiring the contractor to insert similar provisions in each subcontract in excess of $100,000.
Under Sec. 403 (c) these departments are authorized and directed,
wherever in their opinion excessive profits have been realized, or are
likely to be realized from any contract with such departments or from
any subcontract thereunder, to require the contractor or subcontractor
to renegotiate the contract or subcontract prices and to retain or recover any portion of such prices found to represent excessive profits.
Renegotiation is defined in the Act so as to include the refixing by the
Secretary of the Department of the contract price. This section is applicable to all contracts and subcontracts made after April 28, 1942,
and to all contracts and subcontracts theretofore made if final payment
thereon was not made prior to April 28, 1942.
Under Sec. 403 (d) these departments, in renegotiating any contract or subcontract, are directed not to make any allowance for any
salaries, bonuses, or other compensation in excess of a reasonable
amount or for any excessive reserves set up or any costs incurred
which are excessive and unreasonable.
Under Sec. 403 (e) the departments are given the right to demand
of any contractor having contracts subject to the Act, statements of
actual costs of production and such other financial statements at
such times and in such form and detail as they may require; wilful
failure or refusal to furnish such information, or knowingly furnishing of any such statement which is false or misleading in any material respect, are made penal offenses.
Under Sec. 403 (h) the foregoing provisions remain in force during
the continuance of the war and for three years after its termination.
The Congress refrained from setting up standards by which the
2

See Appendix A.
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reasonableness or excessive character of profits may be determined.
There is apparently no limitation on the number of times a contractor may be required to "renegotiate" and no finality to any renegotiation except the limitation of three years after the termination
of the war. There is no definition of the term subcontractor. The
precise relation between price fixing under the Office of Price Administration, and renegotiation under the War Profits Control Act,
is not established. The Act contemplates redetermination of cost
as well as the limitation of profit, so that a corporation's estimate of
profit may be subject to revision under either of these heads. Indications are that, in general, the provisions of T.D. 5000, or the
"Explanation of Principles for Determination of Costs Under
Government Contracts" issued by the War and Navy Departments,
may be used as a guide in determining the admissibility of costs
claimed by the contractor, despite their obvious limitations for profitscontrol purposes, though no pronouncement on this question has
been made. Many elements are apparently being regarded as relevant, such as relation of profit to sales price and to invested capital,
overall results, etc., and the weight assigned to different elements is
not uniform.
To the difficulties heretofore existing in the determination of the
costs, charges, and losses properly deductible from revenues in the
income statement, there is added the difficulty that the revenues
themselves are indeterminate.
Problems of Administration

It is too early to determine how the law will operate in practice.
Manifestly it presents problems of great difficulty and importance
to corporations and accountants. Price adjustment boards have
been set up in the War and Navy Departments and in the U. S.
Maritime Commission, but as yet no indications of the general policies to be followed or of the criteria of the reasonableness of profit
have been made public by them. The situation will perhaps be
somewhat clarified before the end of the calendar year, when it
will assume major importance for accountants.
The committee proposes to reconsider the subject later in the
year. In the meantime, the problem affects corporations which
publish interim statements, and both corporations and their independent auditors in the case of the considerable number of companies which have fiscal years other than the calendar year.
The committee believes that a preliminary bulletin is therefore
opportune.
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Time of Profit and Loss Realization

Delivery of goods sold under contract is normally regarded as
the test of realization of profit or loss. This is so because in ordinary
circumstances such a transaction results in a transfer of property
and the profit or loss taken up is objectively determinable, with substantial accuracy.
A question may be raised whether the latter condition is fulfilled
and if so, how the profit is to be measured, when the contract price
is subject to renegotiation, and particularly where it is highly probable that renegotiation and readjustment will take place.
It seems clear that attribution of the profits as finally determined
to the period in which contracts were performed and deliveries made
is the appropriate treatment. Deferment of credit for profit until
final determination under the contract would lead to artificial results and would not reflect income in accordance with the essential
facts. Still more unreasonable would it be to attribute to the period
of delivery profits based on the terms of the original contract and to
treat readjustments of price resulting from renegotiation as a loss in
the period of redetermination.
Correlation of Price Adjustments and

Taxation

The view to be taken of contract price adjustments for tax purposes
is of crucial importance. In a letter addressed to the chairman of the
Naval Affairs Investigating Committee dated September 16, 1941,
the Treasury Department stated its position in regard to certain refunds of excessive profits made by contractors to the United States
Government.3 The Department's view was that the refund should
be regarded as reducing the original contract price and that the
necessary adjustments should be made in the taxable year or years
in which the original contract price was includable in income. This
ruling is manifestly sound in principle, and an equitable correlation
of renegotiation and taxation, though it may not always be simple in
application. It is not altogether clear that it is mandatory under
existing tax laws and decisions. If the ruling is to be relied on for the
purpose of obtaining such correlation, it should be established beyond
question. The right to apply the results of any redetermination of
contract prices to the taxable period in which the contract income, as
originally determined, was reported, and to secure a refund of income
and excess-profits taxes paid, should be assured to the taxpayer up to a
3

See Appendix B.
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date subsequent to the completion of renegotiation notwithstanding
any statute of limitations.
Corporate reporting practice does not ordinarily contemplate
indefinite postponement of income determination for completed
fiscal periods. As a rule, the determination is made as best it can be
upon the basis of the information available within a few weeks or
months after the end of the period. Unless equitable correlation between renegotiation and taxation is positively assured, the elements
of uncertainty may under existing conditions so far outweigh the
elements capable of reasonably precise ascertainment that it might
be desirable to issue financial statements as provisional, and attach
explanations of the nature of the uncertainties which make definite
presentation impossible.
Presumably, most corporations subject to the renegotiation law
will also be subject to excess-profits taxes. If proper correlation of
renegotiation and such taxes is assured, the uncertainty in regard
to the computation of net income will be greatly mitigated.4
Renegotiation and Financial

Statements

Where government contracts or subcontracts subject to the provisions of the Act constitute a substantial part of the business of a
corporation, the uncertainties resulting from the possibilities of renegotiation will usually be such that appropriate indication of the existence thereof should be given in the financial statements.
It is impossible to lay down general rules for the guidance of independent accountants which could be applied satisfactorily in all
cases. Here, as elsewhere in accounting, there must be an exercise of
judgment which should be based on experience and reached upon a
clear view of the objective to be attained. That objective is to present the fairest possible financial statements, and at the same time to
make clear uncertainties that limit the significance of such statements. In some cases a reserve, shown as a deduction in the income
account, may be desirable, but probably in most cases, particularly at
the present stage, a footnote to the financial statements will accomplish the purpose of disclosure.
4
It has been suggested that correlation be obtained by inserting in the renegotiated
contracts a provision that amounts refunded to the government, or amounts by which
the original contract price is reduced, be offset by the amount of tax which the contractor has paid on the overpayments made by the government, thus eliminating the
necessity of reopening income-tax returns of prior years. Par. 0412, Rewrite Bulletin,
July 1, 1942, p. 145, Commerce Clearing House 421.
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APPENDIX A
RENEGOTIATION PROVISIONS OF SIXTH SUPPLEMENTAL
NATIONAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATION A C T , 1 9 4 2

(Public Law 528, 77th Congress, approved April 28, 1942.)
Sec. 403

(a) For the purposes of this section, the term "Department" means
the War Department, the Navy Department, and the Maritime Commission, respectively; in the case of the Maritime Commission, the
term "Secretary" means the Chairman of such Commission; and
the terms "renegotiate" and "renegotiation" include the refixing by
the Secretary of the Department of the contract price. For the purposes of subsections (d) and (e) of this section, the term "contract"
includes a subcontract and the term "contractor" includes a subcontractor.
(b) The Secretary of each Department is authorized and directed
to insert in any contract for an amount in excess of $100,000 hereafter
made by such Department (1) a provision for the renegotiation of the
contract price at a period or periods when, in the judgment of the
Secretary, the profits can be determined with reasonable certainty;
(2) a provision for the retention by the United States or the repayment
to the United States of (A) any amount of the contract price which is
found as a result of such renegotiation to represent excessive profits
and (B) an amount of the contract price equal to the amount of the
reduction in the contract price of any subcontract under such contract
pursuant to the renegotiation of such subcontract as provided in
clause (3) of this subsection; and (3) a provision requiring the contractor to insert in each subcontract for an amount in excess of $100,000 made by him under such contract (A) a provision for the renegotiation by such Secretary and the subcontractor of the contract price
of the subcontract at a period or periods when, in the judgment of the
Secretary, the profits can be determined with reasonable certainty,
(B) a provision for the retention by the United States or the repayment
to the United States of any amount of the contract price of the subcontract which is found as a result of such renegotiation, to represent
excessive profits, and (C) a provision for relieving the contractor from
any liability to the subcontractor on account of any amount so retained by or repaid to the United States.
(c) The Secretary of each Department is authorized and directed,
whenever in his opinion excessive profits have been realized, or are
likely to be realized, from any contract with such Department or from
any subcontract thereunder, (1) to require the contractor or subcontractor to renegotiate the contract price, (2) to withhold from the
contractor or subcontractor any amount of the contract price which
is found as a result of such renegotiation to represent excessive profits,
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and (3) in case any amount of the contract price found as a result of
such renegotiation to represent excessive profits shall have been paid
to the contractor or subcontractor, to recover such amount from such
contractor or subcontractor. Such contractor or subcontractor shall be
deemed to be indebted to the United States for any amount which
such Secretary is authorized to recover from such contractor or subcontractor under this subsection, and such Secretary may bring
actions in the appropriate courts of the United States to recover such
amount on behalf of the United States. All amounts recovered under
this subsection shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous
receipts. This subsection shall be applicable to all contracts and subcontracts hereafter made and to all contracts and subcontracts heretofore made, whether or not such contracts or subcontracts contain a
renegotiation or recapture clause, provided that final payment pursuant to such contract or subcontract has not been made prior to the
date of enactment of this Act.
(d) In renegotiating a contract price or determining excessive
profits for the purposes of this section, the Secretaries of the respective
Departments shall not make any allowance for any salaries, bonuses,
or other compensation paid by a contractor to its officers or employees
in excess of a reasonable amount, nor shall they make allowance for
any excessive reserves set up by the contractor or for any costs incurred
by the contractor which are excessive and unreasonable. For the purpose of ascertaining whether such unreasonable compensation has
been or is being paid, or whether such excessive reserves have been or
are being set up, or whether any excessive and unreasonable costs have
been or are being incurred, each such Secretary shall have the same
powers with respect to any such contractor that an agency designated
by the President to exercise the powers conferred by title X I I I of the
Second War Powers Act, 1942, has with respect to any contractor to
whom such title is applicable. In the interest of economy and the
avoidance of duplication of inspection and audit, the services of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue shall, upon request of each such Secretary
and the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, be made available
to the extent determined by the Secretary of the Treasury for the
purposes of making examinations and determinations with respect to
profits under this section.
(e) In addition to the powers conferred by existing law, the Secretary of each Department shall have the right to demand of any contractor who holds contracts with respect to which the provisions of this
section are applicable in an aggregate amount in excess of $100,000,
statements of actual costs of production and such other financial statements, at such times and in such form and detail, as such Secretary
may require. Any person who wilfully fails or refuses to furnish any
statement required of him under this subsection, or who knowingly
furnishes any such statement containing information which is false or
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misleading in any material respect, shall, upon conviction thereof, be
punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not
more than two years, or both. The powers conferred by this subsection
shall be exercised in the case of any contractor by the Secretary of the
Department holding the largest amount of such contracts with such
contractor, or by such Secretary as may be mutually agreed to by the
Secretaries concerned.
(f) The authority and discretion herein conferred upon the Secretary of each Department, in accordance with regulations prescribed
by the President for the protection of the interests of the Government,
may be delegated, in whole or in part, by him to such individuals or
agencies in such Department as he may designate, and he may
authorize such individuals or agencies to make further delegations of
such authority and discretion.
(g) If any provision of this section or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the section
and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
(h) This section shall remain in force during the continuance of the
present war and for three years after the termination of the war, but
no court proceedings brought under this section shall abate by reason
of the termination of the provisions of this section.
APPENDIX B
SPECIAL RULING STATING POSITION OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT
REGARDING REFUNDS OF EXCESS PROFITS ON W A R CONTRACTS

(Extract from a letter dated September 16, 1941 from D. W.
Bell, Under Secretary of the Treasury, to Hon. Carl Vinson,
Chairman, Naval Affairs Investigating Committee, House
of Representatives)
Reference is made to your letter of August 21, 1941 in which you
request a statement as to the position of the Department with respect
to the taxation, either by income tax or gift tax, of any refund of
profits made by contractors to the United States Government as a
result of exorbitant profits derived from various contracts entered into
by the Navy Department for the furnishing of materials and the
rendering of services.
Your letter indicates that it has been claimed by at least one of
these contractors that it was advised not to renegotiate its contracts
and refund to the Government all profits in excess of 10 percent because by so doing it would face a tax penalty, either through paying
or having paid income taxes on the profits received or through being
forced to pay a gift tax on any refund.
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It is the view of the Department that under the circumstances
presented any refunds to the Government resulting from adjustments
of such excessive profits serve merely to reduce the original contract
price of the materials furnished and the services rendered. Accordingly, in computing income for Federal income tax purposes, the
original contract price should be reduced by the amount of any refund
of such excessive profits applicable thereto, provided that the original
contract is modified in writing so as to indicate the reduced price.
The necessary adjustment should be made in the taxable year or years
in which the original contract price, with respect to which the refund
is applicable, is includable in income. Only the net amount received
will therefore be reflected in income.
In view of the foregoing and because the gift tax is not deemed to
be applicable it is the view of the Department that any refunds made
to the Government, under the circumstances described above, will not
subject the contractors concerned to any tax penalty.
The statement entitled "The Renegotiation of
War Contracts" was adopted by the assenting votes
of eighteen members of the committee. Three members,
Messrs. Torbet, Wilcox, and Winter, dissented.

Messrs. Torbet, Wilcox, and Winter agree with the conclusions set
forth in the Summary Statement but object to inclusion in this bulletin of any interpretation of the War Profits Control Act and of matters relating to taxation, as being outside the sphere of this committee's
activities.

131

Accounting Research Bulletins

ADDENDUM
While this bulletin was in process of printing, a letter from Randolph
E. Paul, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, to United States
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, dated August 5, 1942, came to the
committee's attention, the text of which is as follows:
Reference is made to the enclosed letter received by you from Mr.
John Lovett, of the Michigan Manufacturers' Association, Detroit,
Mich., dated July 27, 1942.
Mr. Lovett refers to the situation involving renegotiation of Government contracts, and suggests that there should be legislation authorizing the reopening of a taxpayer's Federal income and excess-profits
tax return where subsequent to the filing of such return the taxpayer
is required to repay a portion of its profits pursuant to a renegotiation.
In such case it is the position of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that
under existing law the amount of such taxes may be allowed as a credit
or offset against the taxpayer's liability for repayment of excessive
profits. The Bureau will advise the War Department, Navy Department, or Maritime Commission, as the case may be, of the amount of
such taxes attributable to the amount of any excessive profits to be
repaid pursuant to a renegotiation arrangement. Such Departments
and Commission plan, so I am informed, to allow such taxes as a credit
or offset against the liability for repayment of excessive profits. For
example, if the excessive profits amount to $100,000 and the taxpayer
has paid a tax thereon of $40,000, the Department conducting the
renegotiation will require the contractor to pay into the Treasury only
the net amount of $60,000. Under these circumstances the taxpayer
will in effect secure the relief which Mr. Lovett has in mind, and it will
not be necessary to reopen the tax return. In any case where deemed
necessary, a closing agreement under the provisions of section 3760 of
the Internal Revenue Code may be entered into for the purpose of
definitely fixing the method of treatment for tax purposes. Such agreement will, of course, be binding both upon the taxpayer and the
Bureau. Accordingly, it is believed that this procedure will afford the
taxpayer adequate relief without legislation. It will provide a more
flexible procedure, readily adaptable to variations in specific cases,
than would be afforded by rigid statutory rules.
The subject matter of the letter will require study, and any conclusions reached by the committee will be included in any further bulletin which may be issued later in the year (see page 125 of this bulletin). Attention is also called to footnote 4 on page 127 hereof.
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NOTES
1. Accounting Research Bulletins represent the considered opinion
of at least two-thirds of the members of the committee on accounting
procedure, reached on a formal vote after examination of the subject
matter by the committee and the research department. Except in cases
in which formal adoption by the Institute membership has been asked
and secured, the authority of the bulletins rests upon the general acceptability of opinions so reached. (See Report of Committee on Accounting
Procedure to Council, dated September 18, 1939.)
2. Recommendations of the committee are not intended to be retroactive, nor applicable to immaterial items. (See Bulletin No. 1, page 3.)
3. It is recognized also that any general rules may be subject to exception; it is felt, however, that the burden of justifying departure from
accepted procedures must be assumed by those who adopt other treatment. (See Bulletin No. 1, page 3.)
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